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ROBUST PREDICTIONS IN INFINITE-HORIZON GAMESAN
UNREFINABLE FOLK THEOREM
JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
Abstract. We show that in any game that is continuous at innity, if a plan of action ai
is played by a type ti in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there are perturbations of ti
for which ai is the only rationalizable plan and whose unique rationalizable belief regarding
the play of the game is arbitrarily close to the equilibrium belief of ti. As an application
to repeated games, we prove an unrenable folk theorem: Any individually rational and
feasible payo¤ is the unique rationalizable payo¤ vector for some perturbed type prole.
This is true even if perturbed types are restricted to believe that the repeated-game payo¤
structure and the discount factor are common knowledge.
JEL Numbers: C72, C73.
1. Introduction
In the innite-horizon dynamic games commonly used in economic applications, the set
of equilibrium strategies is often very large. For example, the classic folk theorems for
repeated games state that every individually-rational payo¤ prole can be achieved in a
subgame-perfect equilibrium. A less transparent example is Rubinsteins (1982) bargaining
game; although there is a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, any outcome can occur in
Nash equilibrium. Consequently, economists focus on strong renements of equilibrium and
ignore other equilibria. For instance, they might select the Rubinstein outcome in bargaining
games or an e¢ cient outcome in repeated games. All of these applications assume common
knowledge of payo¤s. The robustness program in game theory seeks to determine when
strong predictions from equilibrium renements can be maintained despite a slight relaxation
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of common-knowledge assumptions.1 Here, we show a lack of robustness of such predictions:
any equilibrium outcome may become uniquely rationalizable when beliefs are perturbed, so
that no equilibrium action can ever be ruled out without an extremely precise knowledge of
playersbeliefs.
Our work here builds on existing results, which show a similar lack of robustness in -
nite games (Weinstein and Yildiz (2007), Chen (2012)). Many important economic models,
including those mentioned above, employ innite-horizon dynamic games, so here we estab-
lish several di¤erent extensions which apply to such games. Our most notable application
is an unrenable folk theorem for innite repeated games: For every payo¤ v in the in-
terior of the individually rational and feasible set, and for su¢ ciently patient players, we
construct a perturbation such that v is the unique rationalizable outcome. Moreover, in the
situation described by the perturbation, all players anticipate that the payo¤s are within an
"-neighborhood of v. That is, the complete-information game is surrounded by types with a
unique solution, but the unique solution varies in such a way that it traces all individually
rational and feasible payo¤s. While the multiplicity in the standard folk theorems suggests
the need for a renement to obtain clear predictions, the multiplicity in our unrenable folk
theorem shows the impossibility of a robust renement. In the same vein, in Rubinsteins
bargaining model, we show that any bargaining outcome is the unique rationalizable outcome
for some perturbation. Once again, no renement can robustly rule out these outcomes.
These applications follow from our Proposition 2, which states: For any Bayesian Nash
equilibrium and any type ti, there exists a perturbed type t^i for which the equilibrium action
plan of ti is the unique rationalizable plan. Furthermore, the unique rationalizable belief
of t^i regarding the outcome is arbitrarily close to the equilibrium belief of ti. In particular,
if the original game has complete information, then the perturbed type assigns probability
nearly one to the equilibrium path (Corollary 1). Here the meaning of perturbationis that
t^i may be chosen such that ti and t^i have similar beliefs about the payo¤ functions, similar
beliefs about the other playersbeliefs about the payo¤ functions, similar beliefs about the
other playersbeliefs about the playersbeliefs about the payo¤ functions, and so on, up to
an arbitrarily chosen nite order. Hence, if a researcher has noisy information about the
playersbeliefs up to a nite order but does not have any other information, then he cannot
1See for example, Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson (1982), Fudenberg, Kreps, and Levine (1988),
Rubinstein (1989), Monderer and Samet (1989), and Kajii and Morris (1997).
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distinguish some of the perturbations t^i from the original type ti. Consequently, he cannot
verify a prediction about the behavior of ti unless it is also true for t^i. In particular, by
Proposition 2, he cannot verify any prediction of an equilibrium renement that does not
follow from equilibrium alone.
In some applications, a researcher may believe that even if there is higher-order uncer-
tainty about payo¤s, there is common knowledge of some of the basic structure of payo¤s and
information. In particular, in a repeated game, he may wish to retain common knowledge
that the playerspayo¤s in the repeated game are the discounted sum of the stage-game
payo¤s. The perturbations constructed in Proposition 2 would not maintain such common
knowledge, and in general, restrictions on perturbations sometimes lead to sharper predic-
tions. In the particular case of repeated games, however, we show (Proposition 5) that our
conclusions remain intact: the perturbed types in the unrenable folk theorem can be con-
structed while maintaining full common knowledge that we are playing a repeated game with
commonly known discount factor, with uncertainly only concerning the stage-game payo¤s.2
In the same vein, Penta (2012a) describes robust predictions, under sequential rationality,
when the fact that certain parameters are known to certain players is common knowledge.
He shows that restrictions on information, combined with restricted payo¤ spaces, may lead
to sharper predictions. In Section 6 we extend Pentas characterization to innite-horizon
games.
Our Proposition 2 applies more narrowly than the existing structure theorems, but with
a stronger conclusion. It applies only to action plans played in some equilibrium, and not to
all rationalizable plans. The stronger conclusion is that the perturbed types actually expect
the selected equilibrium outcome to occur as the unique rationalizable play. Without this
stronger conclusion, the selected outcome may be realized only by types who are surprised
by their opponentsmoves and play moves they did not expect to play (see Example 3).
This would prevent one from applying the existing structure theorems to the analysis of
equilibrium payo¤s, so the stronger conclusion is important to our unrenable folk theorem.
We have also established the natural extension of previous results to all rationalizable actions
in innite dynamic games.
2This result also suggests that one may not need non-trivial commitment types for reputation forma-
tion; uncertainty about the stage payo¤s may be enough when one allows more sophisticated information
structures.
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After laying out the model in the next section, we present our general results in Section
3. We present our applications to repeated games and bargaining in Sections 4 and 5,
respectively. We present extensions of our results to Pentas framework in Section 6. Section
7 concludes. The proofs of our general results are presented in the appendix.
2. Basic Definitions
We suggest that the reader skim this section quickly and refer back as necessary. The
main text is not very notation-heavy.
Extensive game forms. We consider standard n-player extensive-form games with possibly
innite horizon, as modeled in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994). In particular, we x an
extensive game form   =
 
N;H; (Ii)i2N

with perfect recall where N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng is a
nite set of players, H is a set of histories, and Ii is the set of information sets at which
player i 2 N moves. We use i 2 N and h 2 H to denote a generic player and history,
respectively. We write Ii (h) for the information set that contains history h, at which player
i moves, i.e. the set of histories i nds possible when he moves. The set of available moves
at Ii (h) is denoted by Bi (h). We have Bi (h) = fbi : (h; bi) 2 Hg, where (h; bi) denotes the
history in which h is followed by bi. We assume that Bi (h) is nite for each h. An action
plan (or simply action) ai of i is dened as any contingent plan that maps the information
sets of i to the moves available at those information sets; i.e. ai : Ii (h) 7! ai (h) 2 Bi (h).
We write A = A1      An for the set of action proles a = (a1; : : : ; an).3 We write Z
for the set of terminal nodes, including histories of innite length. We write z (a) for the
terminal history that is reached by prole a.
Type spaces. Given an extensive game form, a Bayesian game is dened by specifying the
belief structure about the payo¤s. To this end, we write  (z) = (1 (z) ; : : : ; n (z)) 2 [0; 1]n
for the payo¤ vector at the terminal node z 2 Z and write  for the set of all payo¤
functions  : Z ! [0; 1]n. The payo¤ of i from an action prole a is denoted by ui (; a).
3Notation: Given any list X1; : : : ; Xn of sets, write X = X1     Xn with typical element x, X i =Q
j 6=iXj with typical element x i, and (xi; x i) = (x1; : : : ; xi 1; xi; xi+1; : : : ; xn). Likewise, for any family
of functions fj : Xj ! Yj , we dene f i : X i ! X i by f i (x i) = (fj (xj))j 6=i. This is with the
exception that h is a history as in dynamic games, rather than a prole of hierarchies (h1; : : : ; hn). Given
any topological space X, we write (X) for the space of probability distributions on X, endowed with Borel
-algebra and the weak topology.
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Note that ui (; a) = i (z (a)). We endow  with the product topology (i.e. the topology of
pointwise convergence). Note that  is compact and ui is continuous in . Note, however,
that  is not a metric space. We will use only nite type spaces, so by a model, we mean a
nite set  T1      Tn associated with beliefs ti 2 ( T i) for each ti 2 Ti, where
  . Here, ti is called a type and T = T1      Tn is called a type space. A model
(; T; ) is said to be a common-prior model (with full support) if and only if there exists
a probability distribution p 2 ( T ) with support   T and such that ti = p (jti)
for each ti 2 Ti. Note that ( ;; T; ) denes a Bayesian game. In this paper, we consider
games that vary by their type spaces for a xed game form  .
Hierarchies of Beliefs. Given any type ti in a type space T , we can compute the rst-
order belief h1i (ti) 2 () of ti (about ), second-order belief h2i (ti) 2 ( ()n)
of ti (about  and the rst-order beliefs), etc., using the joint distribution of the types and
. Using the mapping hi : ti 7! (h1i (ti) ; h2i (ti) ; : : :), we can embed all such models in the
universal type space, denoted by T  = T 1      T n (Mertens and Zamir (1985); see also
Brandenburger and Dekel (1993)). We endow the universal type space with the product
topology of usual weak convergence. We say that a sequence of types ti (m) converges to a
type ti, denoted by ti (m) ! ti, if and only if hki (ti (m)) ! hki (ti) for each k, where the
latter convergence is in weak topology, i.e., convergence in distribution.
Equivalence of Actions and Continuity at Innity. We now turn to the details of the
extensive game form. If a history h =
 
bl
L
l=1
is formed by L moves for some nite L, then h
is said to be nite and have length L. If h contains innitely many moves, then h is said to
be innite. A game form is said to have nite horizon if for some L < 1 all histories have
length at most L; the game form is said to have innite horizon otherwise. For any history
h =
 
bl
L
l=1
and any L0, we write hL
0
for the subhistory of h that is truncated at length L0;
i.e. h =
 
bl
minfL;L0g
l=1
. We say that a game ( ;; T; ) is continuous at innity4 (rst dened
by Fudenberg and Levine (1983)) i¤ for any " > 0, there exists L <1, such that
(2.1) 8 2  :
i (h)  i(~h) < " whenever hL = ~hL
4 In that we do not allow L to depend on , this denition assumes that the possible payo¤ functions in
the game are equicontinuous at innity. This equicontinuity, as opposed to mere continuity of each , holds
in all of our applications but is not needed in our propositions; it is useful for establishing certain properties
of interim correlated rationalizability, noted in the next section. See Weinstein and Yildiz (2012) for more.
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for all i 2 N and all terminal histories h; ~h 2 Z.
We say that actions ai and a0i are equivalent if z (ai; a i) = z (a
0
i; a i) for all a i 2 A i.
For any integer L, we say that ai and a0i are L-equivalent if z (ai; a i)
L = z (a0i; a i)
L for all
a i 2 A i. That is, two actions are L-equivalent if both actions prescribe the same moves
in the rst L moves on the path against every action prole a i by others. For the rst L
moves ai and a0i can di¤er only at the informations sets that they preclude. Of course this is
the same as the usual equivalence when the game has a nite horizon that is shorter than L.
We will conne ourselves to the games that are continuous at innity throughout, in-
cluding our perturbations. Note that most games analyzed in economics are continuous at
innity. This includes repeated games with discounting, games of sequential bargaining with
discounting, all nite-horizon games, and so on. Games that are excluded include repeated
games with a limit of averages criterion, or bargaining without discounting; generally, any
case in which there can be a signicant e¤ect from the arbitrarily far future.
Interim Correlated Rationalizability. For each i 2 N and for each belief  2 ( A i),
we write BRi () for the set of actions ai 2 Ai that maximize the expected value of
ui (; ai; a i) under the probability distribution . Note that BRi is non-empty under con-
tinuity at innity, because this implies continuity with respect to the product topology
on histories, and that topology is compact by Tychono¤s theorem. A solution concept
i : ti 7! i [ti]  Ai, i 2 N , is said to have the best-response property if and only if
for each ti and for each ai 2 i [ti], there exists a belief  2 ( T i  A i) such that
ai 2 BRi
 
margA i

, margT i = ti and  (a i 2  i [t i]) = 1. We dene interim
correlated rationalizability (ICR), denoted by S1, as the largest solution concept with best-
response property. This largest set is well-dened because the set of solution concepts with
best-response property is closed under coordinate-wise union, i.e., S1 [ti] is the union of the
sets i [ti] over all solution concepts  with the best-response property.
Under our assumption of continuity at innity, interim correlated rationalizability can
be computed by the following elimination procedure5: For each i and ti, set S0i [ti] =
Ai, and dene sets Ski [ti] for k > 0 iteratively, by letting ai 2 Ski [ti] if and only if
ai 2 BRi
 
margA i

for some  2 ( T i  A i) such that margT i = ti and
5See Weinstein and Yildiz (2012) for a proof of this claim.
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
 
a i 2 Sk 1 i [t i]

= 1. That is, ai is a best response to a belief of ti that puts posi-
tive probability only to the actions that survive the elimination in round k   1. We write
Sk 1 i [t i] =
Q
j 6=i S
k 1
j [tj] and S
k [t] = Sk1 [t1]     Skn [tn]. Then,
S1i [ti] =
1\
k=0
Ski [ti] :
This equality of the two concepts implies that the innite intersection is non-empty.
Interim correlated rationalizability was introduced by Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007)
(see also Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) for a related concept). They show that the ICR
set for a given type is completely determined by its hierarchy of beliefs, so we will sometimes
refer to the ICR set of a hierarchy or universal type.They also show that ICR is upper-
hemicontinuous for nite games. While this is not known to be true for all innite games,
we show that it is true under the present assumptions in Weinstein and Yildiz (2012).
ICR is the weakest rationalizability concept, and our main results such as Proposition 2
carry over to any stronger, non-empty concept by a very simple argument: If an action is
uniquely ICR for a perturbed type, it is also uniquely selected by the stronger concept at
that type. In particular, our result is true without modication for the interim sequential
rationalizability (ISR) concept of Penta (2012a), if no further restriction on playersinforma-
tion and beliefs is made. The concept of ISR does entail some modication to our arguments
when combined with restrictions on playersinformation; see Section 6.
Miscellaneous Denitions and Notation. We x a set A = A1   An of action proles
where Ai selects one representative from each reduced-form equivalence class of action plans
for player i. We call a probability distribution  2     T  i  A i a rationalizable belief
of type ti if margT i = hi(ti) and 
 
a i 2 S1 i [t i]

= 1. Given any strategy prole
s : T ! A, we write  (jti; s) 2 
 
  T  i  A i

for the belief of type ti given that
the other players play according to s i. We write Pr (j; si) and E [j; ai] for the resulting
probability measure and expectation operator from playing ai against belief , respectively.
The expectation operator under  (jti; s) is denoted by E [js; ti].
8 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
It has recently become common in game theory to reserve the term knowledge for cases
where truth axiom holds, and refer to certainty when players are certain but may be wrong6.
In this paper, we use this nuanced language, although the distinction is not important for our
analysis, and the general reader will not lose by reading common certaintyand common
knowledgeas alike. In particular, for any type space (; T; ), we say that type ti knows
an event (or a proposition) if the event (or the proposition) holds on   ftig  T i, and
say that type ti is certain of the event if ti assigns probability 1 to that event. Likewise,
an event (or a proposition) is common knowledge (according to ti) if it holds everywhere on
T ; the event is common certainty according to ti if it holds on a belief-closed subspace
that contains ti. When types are embedded in a universal type space, knowledge is relaxed
to certainty; we still say that an event is common knowledge according to hi (ti) if it is
common knowledge according to ti. In our informal discussions, we say that one drops a
common knowledge assumption if he allows perturbed types coming from spaces in which
the assumption may fail, and we say that one retains a common knowledge assumption if he
restricts the perturbations to the type spaces in which the assumption holds throughout.
3. Structure Theorem
In this section we will present our main result for general innite-horizon games. Given
any game ( ;; T; ) that is continuous at innity and any Bayesian Nash equilibrium s :
T ! A, we will show that there are perturbations t^i of types ti for which si
 
t^i

is the only
rationalizable plan. Moreover, the unique rationalizable belief of t^i regarding the outcomes is
arbitrarily close to the belief of t^i under s. The following structure theorem extends existing
results and plays a crucial role in our construction.
Proposition 1. For any game ( ;; T; ) that is continuous at innity, for any type ti 2 Ti
of any player i 2 N , any rationalizable action ai 2 S1i [ti] of ti, any neighborhood Ui of hi(ti)
in the universal type space T , and any L, there exists a hierarchy hi
 
t^i
 2 Ui; such that
for each a0i 2 S1i

t^i

, a0i is L-equivalent to ai, and t^i is a type in some nite, common-prior
model.
6The truth axiom states that anything which is known is always true. The distinction of knowledge from
certainty can be critical in dynamic games when a zero-probability event occurs. An event which was known
is then still known, while that which was merely certain may be no longer certain.
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In Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) we showed the structure theorem for nite-action games
in normal form, under the assumption that the space of payo¤s is rich enough that any
action is dominant under some payo¤ specication. While this richness assumption holds
when one relaxes all common-knowledge assumptions on payo¤ functions in a static game,
it fails if one xes a non-trivial dynamic game tree. This is because a plan of action cannot
be strictly dominant when some information sets may not be reached. Chen (2012) has
nonetheless extended the structure theorem to nite dynamic games, showing that the same
result holds under the weaker assumption that all payo¤ functions on the terminal histories
are possible. Here, we extend Chens results further by allowing innite-horizon games that
are continuous at innity.
The result can then be interpreted as follows: Consider a type t with a rationalizable
action plan a. For some arbitrarily chosen k, suppose we nd it impossible to distinguish
types whose beliefs are similar up through order k. The lemma states that, for any L, there
is a nite Bayesian game with type t^ who we cannot distinguish from t and for which a is
the unique rationalizable action plan through period L.
Proposition 1 has one important limitation. Given any rationalizable path z (a) and L,
Proposition 1 establishes that there is a prole t = (t1; : : : ; tn) of perturbed types for which
zL (a) is the unique rationalizable path up to L. Nevertheless, these perturbed types may
all nd the path zL (a) unlikely at the start of play, as we establish next.
Cooperation in Twice-Repeated PrisonersDilemma. Consider a twice-repeated pris-
onersdilemma game with complete information and with no discounting. We shall need the
standard condition u(C;D) + u(D;C) > 2u(D;D), where u is the payo¤ of player 1 in the
stage game and C and D stand for the actions Cooperate and Defect, respectively. In the
twice-repeated game, the following tit-for-tatstrategy is rationalizable:
aT4T : play Cooperate in the rst round, and in the second round play what the other player
played in the rst round.
Then, by Proposition 1, there exists a perturbation tT4T of the common-knowledge type
for which aT4T is the unique rationalizable action. If both players have type tT4T , the unique
rationalizable action prole
 
aT4T ; aT4T

leads to cooperation in both rounds. However, we
can deduce that the constructed type will necessarily nd this outcome unlikely. Since tT4T
has a unique best reply, the player must assign positive probability to the event that the other
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player cooperates in the rst round. Such cooperation must make him update his beliefs
about the payo¤s in such a way that Cooperate becomes a better response than Defect.
Since the denition of perturbation requires that, ex ante, he believes with high probability
the payo¤s are similar to the repeated prisoner dilemma, under which Defect is dominant
in the second round, this drastic updating implies that tT4T nds it unlikely that the other
player will play Cooperate in the rst round. Therefore, the perturbed type is nearly certain
that he will play Defect in the second round.
The above example demonstrates that the beliefs of the perturbed types in Proposition
1 may drastically diverge from the unique rationalizable outcome. This prevents us from
applying Proposition 1 to study the expected payo¤s and the playersintended play. Our
next result overcomes this limitation. For this, we need an outcome to be a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium rather than merely rationalizable.
Proposition 2. Let G = ( ;; T; ) be a Bayesian game that is continuous at innity, and
s : T ! A be a strategy prole in G. Then, the following are equivalent:
(A): s is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of G.
(B): For any i 2 N , for any ti 2 Ti, for any neighborhood Ui of hi(ti) in the universal
type space T , and for any neighborhood Vi of the belief  (jti; s) of type ti under
s, there exists a hierarchy hi
 
t^i
 2 Ui such that
(1) ai 2 S1i

t^i

i¤ ai is equivalent to si (ti), and
(2) the unique rationalizable belief ^ 2     T  i  A i of t^i is in Vi.
Moreover, for every " > 0, t^i above can be chosen so that jE [uj (; a) j; ai ]  E [uj (; a) js; ti]j 
" for all j 2 N .
Given a Bayesian Nash equilibrium s, the rst conclusion states that the equilibrium
action si (ti) is the only rationalizable action for the perturbed type in reduced form. The
second conclusion states that the rationalizable belief of the perturbed type t^i is approxi-
mately the same as the equilibrium belief of the original type ti. Hence, the limitation of
Proposition 1 above does not apply. Moreover, the second conclusion immediately implies
that the interim expected payo¤s according to the perturbed type t^i under rationalizability
are close to the equilibrium expected payo¤s according to ti. All in all, Proposition 2 estab-
lishes that no equilibrium outcome can be ruled out as the unique rationalizable outcome
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without knowledge of innite hierarchy of beliefs, both in terms of actual realization and in
terms of playersex-ante expectations.
One may wonder if one can reach such a strong conclusion for other rationalizable strate-
gies. The answer is a rm no; in fact, Proposition 2 establishes that the converse is also true:
if for every type ti one can nd a perturbation under which the the playersinterim beliefs
are close to the beliefs under the original strategy prole s (condition 2) and if the action
si (ti) is uniquely rationalizable for the perturbed type (condition 1), then s
 is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. This is simply because, by the Maximum Theorem, the two conditions
imply that si (ti) is indeed a best reply for ti against s

 i.
We will later apply this result to some popular complete-information games. In order to
state the result for complete-information games, we x a payo¤ function , and consider the
game in which  is common knowledge. This game is represented by type prole tCK ()
in the universal type space.
Corollary 1. Let
 
 ; fg ;tCK ()	 ;  be a complete-information game that is continu-
ous at innity, and a be a Nash equilibrium of this game. For any i 2 N , for any neighbor-
hood Ui of hi(tCKi (
)) in the universal type space T , and any " > 0, there exists a hierarchy
hi
 
t^i
 2 Ui; such that for every rationalizable belief  of t^i,
(1) ai 2 S1i

t^i

i¤ ai is equivalent to ai ;
(2) Pr (z (a) j; ai )  1  ", and
(3) jE [uj (; a) j; ai ]  uj (; a)j  " for all j 2 N .
For any Nash equilibrium a of any complete-information game, the corollary presents a
prole t^ of perturbations under which (1) the equilibrium a is the unique rationalizable
action prole, (2) all playersrationalizable beliefs assign nearly probability one to the equi-
librium outcome z (a), and (3) the expected payo¤s under these beliefs are nearly identical
to the equilibrium payo¤s. As established in Proposition 2, one can nd such perturbations
only for Nash equilibria.
The proof of Proposition 2 uses a contagion argument that is suitable for equilibrium. In
order to illustrate the construction, we sketch the proof for the complete-information games
considered in the corollary. Building on Proposition 1 we rst show that for each action
ai there exists a type tai for which ai is uniquely rationalizable, extending a result of Chen
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to innite-horizon games. For any Nash equilibrium a of any complete-information game 
 ; fg ;tCK ()	 ; , we construct a family of types tj;m;, j 2 N , m 2 N,  2 [0; 1], by
tj;0; = t
aj ;
tj;m; = ta

j
+ (1  ) (;t i;m 1;) 8m > 0;
where (;t i;m 1;) is the Dirac measure that puts probability one on (
; t i;m 1;). For
large m and small , ti;m; satises all the desired properties of t^i. To see this, rst note
that for  = 0, under ti;m;0, it is mth-order mutual certainty that  = 
. Hence, when m is
large and  is small, the belief hierarchy of ti;m;0 is close to the belief hierarchy of tCKi (
),
according to which it is common knowledge that  = . Second, for  > 0, aj is uniquely
rationalizable for tj;m; in reduced form. To see this, observing that it is true for m = 0 by
denition of tj;0;, assume that it is true up to some m 1. Then, any rationalizable belief of
any type tj;m; must be a mixture of two beliefs. With probability , his belief is the same as
that of ta

j , to which aj is the unique best response in reduced form actions. With probability
1   , the true state is  and the other players play a j (in reduced form), in which case
aj is a best reply, as a
 is a Nash equilibrium under . Therefore, in reduced form aj is
the unique best response to any of his rationalizable beliefs, showing that aj is uniquely
rationalizable for tj;m; in reduced form. Finally, for any m > 0, under rationalizability
type ti;m; must assign at least probability 1   on
 
; a i

in reduced form because a i is
uniquely rationalizable for t i;m 1; in reduced form.
4. Application: An Unrefinable Folk Theorem
In this section, we consider innitely repeated games with complete information. Under
the standard assumptions for the folk theorem, we prove an unrenable folk theorem, which
concludes that for every individually rational and feasible payo¤ vector v, there exists a
perturbation of beliefs under which there is a unique rationalizable outcome and players
expect to enjoy approximately the payo¤ vector v under any rationalizable belief.
For simplicity, we consider a simultaneous-action stage game G = (N;B; g) where B =
B1   Bn is the set of proles b = (b1; : : : ; bn) of moves and g : B ! [0; 1]n is the vector
of stage payo¤s. Without loss of generality, we will assume that each player i has at least
two moves in the stage game, i.e., jBij  2. We have perfect monitoring. Hence, a history is
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a sequence h =
 
bl

l2N of proles b
l =
 
bl1; : : : ; b
l
n

. In the complete-information game, the
players maximize the average discounted stage payo¤s. That is, the payo¤ function is
 (h) = (1  )
nX
l=0
lg
 
bl
 8h =  bl
l2N

where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, which we will let vary. Denote the repeated game by
G =
 
 ; fg ;

tCK ()
	
; 

.
Let V = co (g (B)) be the set of feasible payo¤ vectors (from correlated mixed action
proles), where co takes the convex hull. Dene also the pure-action min-max payo¤ as
vi = min
b i2B i
max
bi2Bi
g (b)
for each i 2 N . We dene the set of feasible and individually rational payo¤ vectors as
V  = fv 2 V jvi > vi for each i 2 Ng :
We denote the interior of V  by intV . The interior will be non-empty when a weak form
of full-rank assumption holds. The following lemma states a typical folk theorem (see
Proposition 9.3.1 in Mailath and Samuelson (2006) and also Fudenberg and Maskin (1991)).
Lemma 1. For every v 2 intV , there exists  < 1 such that for all  2  ; 1, G has a
subgame-perfect equilibrium a in pure strategies, such that u ( ; a
) = v.
The lemma states that every feasible and individually rational payo¤ vector in the interior
can be supported as the subgame-perfect equilibrium payo¤when the players are su¢ ciently
patient. Given such a large multiplicity, both theoretical and applied researchers often focus
on e¢ cient equilibria (or extremal equilibria). Combining such a folk theorem with Corollary
1, our next result establishes that the multiplicity is irreducible.
Proposition 3. For all v 2 intV  and " > 0, there exists  < 1 such that for all  2  ; 1,
every open neighborhood U of tCK () contains a type prole t^ 2 U such that
(1) each t^i has a unique rationalizable action ai in reduced form, and
(2) under every rationalizable belief  of t^i, the expected payo¤s are all within " neigh-
borhood of v:
jE [uj (; a) j; ai ]  vj  " 8j 2 N:
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Proof. Fix any v 2 intV  and " > 0. By Lemma 1, there exists  < 1 such that for all  2 
; 1

, G has a subgame-perfect equilibrium a in pure strategies, such that u (

 ; a
) = v.
Then, by Corollary 1, for any  2  ; 1 and any open neighborhood U of tCK (), there
exists a type prole t^ 2 U such that each t^i has a unique rationalizable action ai in reduced
form (Part 1 of Corollary 1), and under every rationalizable belief  of t^i, the expected
payo¤s are all within " neighborhood of u ( ; a
) = v (Part 3 of Corollary 1). 
Proposition 3 establishes an unrenable folk theorem. It states that every individually
rational and feasible payo¤ v in the interior can be supported by the unique rationaliz-
able outcome for some perturbation. Moreover, in the actual situation described by the
perturbation, all players play according to the subgame-perfect equilibrium that supports
v and all players anticipate that the payo¤s are within " neighborhood of v. That is, the
complete-information game is surrounded by types with a unique solution, but the unique
solution varies in such a way that it traces all individually rational and feasible payo¤s.
While the multiplicity in the standard folk theorems may suggest a need for a renement,
the multiplicity in our unrenable folk theorem emphasizes the impossibility of a robust
renement.
Structure Theorem with Uncertainty only about the Stage Payo¤s. An important
drawback of the structure theorems is that they may rely on the existence of types who are
far from the payo¤and information structure assumed in the original model. If a researcher is
willing to make common-knowledge assumptions regarding these structures (by considering
only the type spaces in which these structures are true throughout), those theorems may
become inapplicable. Indeed, recent papers (e.g. Weinstein and Yildiz (2011) and Penta
(2012a, 2012b)) study the robust predictions when some common knowledge assumptions
are retained.
In repeated games, one may wish to maintain common knowledge of the repeated-game
payo¤ structure. Unfortunately, in our proofs of the propositions above, the types we con-
struct do not preserve common knowledge of such a structure  they may depend on the
entire history in ways which are not additively separable across stages. It is more di¢ cult
to construct types with unique rationalizable action when we restrict the perturbations to
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preserve common knowledge of the repeated-game structure, but in our next two proposi-
tions we are able to do this. The proofs (deferred to the Appendix) are somewhat lengthy
and require the use of incentive structures similar to those in the repeated-game literature.
For any xed discount factor  2 (0; 1), we dene
(4.1)  =
(
;g
 
b0; b1; : : :
  (1  ) 1X
l=0
lg
 
bl
 jg : B ! [0; 1]n)
as the set of repeated games with discount factor . Here,  allows uncertainty about the
stage payo¤s g, but xes all the other aspects of the repeated game, including the discount
factor. For a xed complete information repeated game with stage-payo¤ function g, we
are interested in the predictions which are robust against perturbations in which it remains
common knowledge that the payo¤s come from , allowing only uncertainty about the
stage payo¤s. The complete information game is represented by type prole tCK (;g) in
the universal type space. The next result extends Corollary 1 to this case.
Proposition 4. For any  2 (0; 1), let   ; fg ;tCK (;g)	 ;  be a complete-information
repeated game and a be a Nash equilibrium of this game. For any i 2 N , for any neighbor-
hood Ui of hi(tCKi (;g)) in the universal type space T
, any " > 0 and any L, there exists
a hierarchy hi
 
t^i
 2 Ui; such that
(1) ai 2 S1i

t^i

i¤ ai is L-equivalent to ai ;
(2) jE [uj (; a) j]  uj (; a)j  " for all j 2 N and for all rationalizable belief  of t^i
on (; a), and
(3) according to t^i it is common knowledge that  2 .
Proposition 4 strengthens Corollary 1 by adding the last condition that the perturbed
type still nds it common knowledge that he is playing a repeated game that is identical
to the original complete-information game in all aspects except for the stage payo¤s. The
conclusion is weakened only by being silent about the tails, which will be immaterial to our
conclusions. Indeed, using Proposition 4 instead of Corollary 1 in the proof of Proposition
3, which is the main result in this application, one can easily extend that folk theorem to
the world in which a researcher is willing to retain common knowledge of the repeated game
structure:
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Proposition 5. For all v 2 intV , there exists  < 1 such that for all  2  ; 1, for all
" > 0 and all L < 1, every open neighborhood U of tCK () contains a type prole t^ 2 U
such that
(1) each t^i has a unique rationalizable action plan ai up to date L in reduced form;
(2) under every rationalizable belief  of t^i, the expected payo¤s are all within " neigh-
borhood of v:
jE [uj (; a) j]  vj  " 8j 2 N;
(3) and it is common knowledge according to t^ that  2 .
That is, even if a researcher is willing to assume the repeated game payo¤ structure,
for high discount factors, he cannot rule out any feasible payo¤ vector as the approximate
outcome of the unique rationalizable belief for some nearby type. Hence, allowing uncertainty
about the stage payo¤s is su¢ cient to reach the conclusion of the unrenable folk theorem
above.
Proposition 4 is proved in the Appendix. The proof rst involves showing that each action
plan is uniquely rationalizable, up to an arbitrarily long nite horizon, for a type for which
it is common knowledge that  2 . The construction of these types is rather involved,
and uses ideas from learning and incentives in repeated games. Using the existence of these
types, one then constructs the nearby types in the proposition following the ideas sketched
in illustrating the proof of Corollary 1 above. In the following example we illustrate the gist
of the idea on the twice-repeated prisonersdilemma.
Example 1. Consider again the twice-repeated prisonersdilemma with gPD1 (C;D)+g
PD
1 (D;C) >
2gPD1 (D;D), where g
PD
1 is the payo¤ of player 1 in the stage game, and  = 1. Given a type
according to which the payo¤s gPD are common knowledge, we will construct a nearby type
for which tit-for-tat is uniquely rationalizable. To this end, we rst construct some types (not
necessarily nearby) for which certain action plans are uniquely rationalizable. For any strat-
egy prole b 2 fC;Dg2 in the stage game, consider the payo¤ function gb where gbi (b01; b02) = 1
if b0i = bi and g
b
i (b
0
1; b
0
2) = 0 otherwise. For a type ti;bi;0 that puts probability 1 on ;g(bi;b i)
for some b i, playing bi in the rst round is uniquely rationalizable. Such a type may have
multiple rationalizable actions in the second round, as he may assign zero probability to
some history. But now consider a type ti;bi;1 that puts probability 1/2 on


;g(bi;b i) ; t i;C;0

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and probability 1/2 on


;g(bi;b i) ; t i;D;0

for some b i. Since types t i;C;0 and t i;D;0 play
C and D, respectively, as their unique rationalizable move in the rst round, type ti;bi;1
puts positive probability at all histories at the beginning of the second period that are not
precluded by his own action. Hence, his unique rationalizable action plan is to play bi at
all histories. We next construct types ti;k with approximate kth-order mutual certainty of
prisonersdilemma payo¤s who Defect at all histories in their unique rationalizable plan.
Type ti;1 puts probability 1=2 on each of
 
;gPD ; t i;C;1

and
 
;gPD ; t i;D;1

. Since the other
player does not react to the moves of player i and i is certain that he plays a prisoners
dilemma game, his unique rationalizable plan is to defect everywhere (as he assigns posi-
tive probabilities to both moves). Proceeding inductively on k, for any small " and k > 1,
consider the type ti;k who puts probability 1   " on
 
;gPD ; t i;k 1

and probability " on 
;gPD ; t i;C;1

. By the previous argument, type ti;k also defects at all histories as the unique
rationalizable plan. Moreover, when " is small, there is approximate kth-order mutual cer-
tainty of prisonersdilemma. Now for arbitrary k > 1 and small " > 0, consider the type
t^i;k that puts probability 1  " on
 
;gPD ; t i;k 1

and probability " on
 
;g(C;C) ; t i;C;1

. He
has approximate kth-order mutual certainty of the prisonersdilemma payo¤s. Moreover,
since his opponent does not react to his moves and " is small, his unique rationalizable move
at the rst period is D. In the second period, if he observes that his opponent played D
in the rst period, he becomes sure that they play prisonersdilemma and plays D as his
unique rationalizable move. If he observes that his opponent played C, however, he updates
his belief and put probability 1 on g(C;C) according to which C dominates D. In that case,
he too plays C in the second period. The types t^i;k, which are close to common-knowledge
types, defect in period 1 and play tit-for-tat in period 2. Now consider the nearby types ~ti;k
that put probability 1   " on  ;gPD ; t^ i;k 1 and probability " on  ;g(C;C) ; t i;C;1. These
types believe that their opponent probably plays defection followed by tit-for-tat, so they
cooperate in the rst period. In the second period, if they saw D, they still think they are
playing prisoners dilemma, so they defect. If they saw C, they think they are playing g(C;C),
so they cooperate. That is, their unique rationalizable action is tit-for-tat with cooperation
at the initial node.
Early literature identied two mechanisms through which a small amount of incomplete
information can have a large e¤ect: reputation formation (Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and
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Wilson (1982)) and contagion (Rubinstein (1989)). In reputation formation, one learns about
the other playerspayo¤s from their unexpected moves. As in Example 1, our perturbed types
in the proof of Proposition 4 generalize this idea: they learn not only about the other players
payo¤s but also about their own payo¤s from the othersunexpected moves. Moreover, our
perturbations are explicitly constructed using a generalized contagion argument. Hence,
the perturbations here and in Chen (2012) combine the two mechanisms in order to obtain a
very strong conclusion: any rationalizable action can be made uniquely rationalizable under
some perturbation.
At another level, however, Propositions 4 and 5 make a stronger point than the previous
reputation and contagion literatures, in the following sense: The existing models mainly
rely on behavioral commitment types (or crazy types) that follow a complete plan of
action throughout the game, suggesting that non-robustness may be due to psychologi-
cal/behavioral concerns that are overlooked in game-theoretical analyses. By proving the
unrenable folk theorem while allowing uncertainty only about the stage payo¤s7, Proposi-
tions 4 and 5 show that informational concerns can lead to the non-robustness results, even
without a full range of crazy types.
Chassang and Takahashi (2011) examine the question of robustness in repeated games
from an ex ante perspective. That is, following Kajii and Morris (1997), they dene an
equilibrium as robust if approximately the same outcome is possible in a class of elaborations.
(An elaboration is an incomplete-information game in which each player believes with high
probability that the original game is being played.) They consider specically elaborations
with serially independent types, so that the moves of players do not reveal any information
about their payo¤s and behavior in the future. They obtain a useful one-shot robustness
result to paraphrase, an equilibrium of the repeated game is robust if the equilibrium
at each stage game, augmented with continuation values, is risk-dominant. There are two
major distinctions from our work here. First, their perturbations are dened from an ex ante
perspective, by what players believe before receiving information. Ours are from an interim
perspective, based on what players believe just before play begins. This could be subsequent
to receiving information, but our setup does not actually require reference to a particular
7Of course, this allows for crazytypes who always play the same action but not for those who play
any more complicated plan, say tit-for-tat.
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information structure (type space with prior). For more on the distinction between these
approaches, see our 2007 paper. Second, while they focus on serially independent types,
whose moves do not reveal any information about future payo¤s, the moves of our perturbed
types reveal information about both their own and the other playersstage-game payo¤s,
which are assumed to be constant over time.
Some other papers have also restricted attention to perturbations which keep some payo¤
structure common knowledge. In Weinstein and Yildiz (2011), we dealt with nice games,
which are static games with unidimensional action spaces and strictly concave utility func-
tions. We obtained a characterization for sensitivity of Bayesian Nash equilibria in terms of
a local version of ICR, allowing arbitrary common-knowledge restrictions on payo¤s.8 In the
same vein, Oury and Tercieux (2007) allow arbitrarily small perturbations on payo¤s to ob-
tain an equivalence between continuous partial implementation in Bayesian Nash equilibria
and full implementation in rationalizable strategies. Most generally, Penta (2012b) proved a
version of the structure theorem under arbitrarily given common-knowledge restrictions on
payo¤s, identifying a set of actions that can be made uniquely rationalizable by perturbing
the interim beliefs under the given common knowledge restrictions on payo¤s.
We establish that equilibrium renements are not upper hemicontinuous, even if one im-
poses common-knowledge restrictions on the payo¤ structure. This results in the lack of
robustness above. One may, however, raise the same criticism for unrened solution con-
cepts, such as Bayesian Nash equilibrium and ICR. Extending the results of Dekel, Fuden-
berg, and Morris (2007) for nite games to the innite games we analyze here, we show in
Weinstein and Yildiz (2012) that ICR is upper hemicontinuous under the usual continuity
and compactness properties, provided that the space of payo¤s can be embedded into a com-
pact metric space. In particular, we show that ICR is upper hemicontinuous whenever the
payo¤s are restricted to be in , imposing common knowledge of the repeated-game payo¤
structure and the discount factor. In fact, it su¢ ces for the discount factor to be unknown
but bounded away from 1. Therefore, the predictions of ICR are robust under the above
restriction. This further implies that the unique solution for the perturbed types remains
robust with respect to further perturbations. We should note, however, that the set  of all
8Weinstein and Yildiz (2011) also solve the problem of uncountable action spaces within the important
class of nice games using a special structure of those games, which is clearly di¤erent from the structure in
innite-horizon games that allowed our characterization.
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payo¤ functions in innite-horizon games is not metrizable (or sequentially compact), and so
we do not know if ICR is upper hemicontinuous in the entire universal type space. We should
also note that, while Bayesian Nash equilibrium is not upper hemicontinuous in general (by
Proposition 1), it is robust with respect to perturbations that assign high probability on the
unique outcome (as in Proposition 2).
5. Application: Incomplete Information in Bargaining
In a model of bilateral bargaining with complete information, Rubinstein (1982) shows that
there exists a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Subsequent research illustrates that the
equilibrium result is sensitive to incomplete information. In this section, using Proposition
2, we show quite generally that the equilibrium must be highly sensitive: every bargaining
outcome can be supported as the unique rationalizable outcome for a nearby model.
We consider Rubinsteins alternating-o¤er model with nite set of divisions. There are
two players, N = f1; 2g, who want to divide a dollar. The set of possible shares is X =
f0; 1=m; 2=m; : : : ; 1g for some m > 1. At date 0, Player 1 o¤ers a division (x; 1  x), where
x 2 X is the share of Player 1 and 1 x is the share of Player 2. Player 2 decides whether to
accept or reject the o¤er. If he accepts, the game ends with division (x; 1  x). Otherwise,
we proceed to the next date. At date 1, Player 2 o¤ers a division (y; 1  y), and Player 1
accepts or rejects the o¤er. In this fashion, players make o¤ers back and forth until an o¤er
is accepted. We denote the bargaining outcome by (x; l) if players reach an agreement on
division (x; 1  x) at date l. In the complete-information game, the payo¤ function is
 =
(
l (x; 1  x) if the outcome is (x; l)
0 if players never agree
for some  2 (0; 1).
When X = [0; 1], in the complete information game G =
 
 ; fg ;tCK ()	 ; , there
is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, and the bargaining outcome in the unique subgame-
perfect equilibrium is
(x; 0) = (1= (1 + ) ; 0) .
That is, the players immediately agree on division (x; 1  x). When X = f0; 1=m; : : : ; 1g
as in here, there are more subgame-perfect equilibria due to multiple equilibrium behavior
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in the case of indi¤erence. Nevertheless, the bargaining outcomes of these equilibria all
converge to (x; 0) as m!1.
In contrast with the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, there is a large multiplicity of
non-subgame-perfect Nash equilibria, but these equilibria are ignored as they rely on incred-
ible threats or sequentially irrational moves o¤ the path. Building on such non-subgame-
perfect Nash equilibria and Proposition 2, the next result shows that each bargaining outcome
is the outcome of unique rationalizable action plan under some perturbation.
Proposition 6. For any bargaining outcome (x; l) 2 X  N and any " > 0, every open
neighborhood U of tCK () contains a type prole t^ 2 U such that
(1) each t^i has a unique rationalizable action ai in reduced form;
(2) the bargaining outcome under a is (x; l), and
(3) every rationalizable belief of t^i assigns at least probability 1  " on (x; l).
Proof. We will show that the complete-information game has a Nash equilibrium a with
bargaining outcome (x; l). Proposition 2 then establishes the existence of type prole t^ as in
the statement of the proposition. Consider the case of even l, at which Player 1 makes an
o¤er; the other case is identical. Dene a in reduced-form as
(a1) at any date l
0 6= l, o¤er only (1; 0) and reject all the o¤ers; o¤er (x; 1  x) at date l;
(a2) at any date l
0 6= l, o¤er only (0; 1) and reject all the o¤ers; accept only (x; 1  x) at l.
It is clear that a is a Nash equilibrium, and the bargaining outcome under a is (x; l). 
That is, for every bargaining outcome (x; l), one can introduce a small amount of incom-
plete information in such a way that the resulting type prole has a unique rationalizable
action prole and it leads to the bargaining outcome (x; l). Moreover, in the perturbed
type prole, players are all nearly certain that (x; l) will be realized. Unlike in the case of
non-subgame-perfect equilibria, one cannot rule out these outcomes by renement because
there is a unique rationalizable outcome. In order to rule out these outcomes, one either
needs to introduce irrational behavior or rule out the information structure that leads to
the perturbed type prole by at (as he cannot rule out these structures by observation
of nite-order beliefs without ruling out the original model). Therefore, despite the unique
subgame-perfect outcome in the original model, and despite the fact that this outcome has
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generated many important and intuitive insights, one cannot make any prediction on the
outcome without introducing irrational behavior or making informational assumptions that
cannot be veried by observing nite-order beliefs.
The existing literature already illustrates that the subgame-perfect equilibrium is sensitive
to incomplete information. For example, for high , the literature on the Coase conjecture
establishes that if one party has a private information about his own valuation, then he gets
everything in contrast to the nearly equal sharing in the complete information game. This
further leads to delay due to reputation formation in bargaining with two-sided incomplete
information on payo¤s (Abreu and Gul (2000)) or on playerssecond-order beliefs (Feinberg
and Skrzypacz (2005)).
Proposition 6 di¤ers from these results in many ways. The rst di¤erence is in the scope
of sensitivity: while the existing results show that another outcome may occur under a per-
turbation, Proposition 6 shows that any outcome can be supported by a perturbation. The
second di¤erence is in the solution concept: while the existing result show sensitivity with
respect to a sequential equilibrium or all sequential equilibria, there is a unique rationaliz-
able outcome in Proposition 6, ruling out reinstating the original outcome by a renement.
Third, the existing results often consider the limit  ! 0, which is already a point of discon-
tinuity for the complete-information model. In contrast,  is xed in Proposition 6. Finally,
existing results consider simple perturbations, and these perturbations may correspond the
specication of economic parameters, such as valuation, or may be commitment types. In
contrast, given the generality of the results, the types constructed in our paper are compli-
cated, and it is not easy to interpret how they are related to the economic parameters. (In
specic examples, the same results could be obtained using simple types that correspond to
economic parameters, as in Izmalkov and Yildiz (2010)).
6. Information and Sequential Rationality
We have discussed earlier that when analyzing robustness, one may want to consider only
perturbations which retain some structural common-knowledge assumptions, such as the
additive payo¤ structure in a repeated game, or the fact that a player knows the true value
of a certain parameter. When the set of possible payo¤ functions is the same from the point
of view of every player, our formalism su¢ ces for this. If each player may have his own
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information, and furthermore this information (unlike mere beliefs) is never doubted even
when probability-zero events occur, a slightly di¤erent setup, introduced by Penta (2012a),
is necessary. This setup is needed, for instance, to analyze a case in which it is common
knowledge that players know (and never doubt) their own utility functions. When the
underlying set of payo¤parameters is su¢ ciently rich (e.g. when all possible payo¤ functions
are available as in our model above), retaining such assumptions does not lead to any change,
and the original characterization in Proposition 1 remains intact. In restricted parameter
sets, retaining the informational assumption may lead to somewhat sharper predictions.
For example, in private value environments, this allows one round of elimination of weakly
dominated actions in addition to rationalizability. In this section, building on an extension
of the result of Penta (2012a) to innite horizon games, we will extend our results to Pentas
setup. Note also that Pentas framework is related to that of Battigalli and Siniscalchi
(2003), who introduced a version of rationalizability for extensive-form games which allowed
for restrictions on playersbeliefs about their opponentsbehavior.
Consider a compact set C = C0  C1      Cn of payo¤ parameters c = (c0; c1; : : : ; cn)
where the underlying payo¤ functions  depends on the payo¤ parameters c:  = f (c)
for some continuous and one-to-one mapping f : C ! . We will assume it is common
knowledge that  lies in the subspace f (C)  . It will also be assumed to be common
knowledge throughout the section that the true value of the parameter ci is known by player
i. For any type ti, we will write ci (ti) for the true value of ci, which is known by ti. Note
that this formulation subsumes our model above, by simply letting C1; : : : ; Cn be trivial
(singletons) so that  = C0. We will write TC  T  for the subspace of the universal type
space in which it is common knowledge that  2 f (C) and each player i knows the true value
of ci. As in Penta (2012a), we will restrict perturbations to lie in TC. Following Penta, we
will further focus on multistage games in which all previous moves are publicly observable.
A conjecture of a player i is a conditional probability system i =
 
i;h

h2H that is
consistent with Bayesrule (on positive probability events), where i;h 2 (C0  T i  A i)
for each h 2 H. Here, it is implicitly assumed that it remains common knowledge throughout
the game that (c1; : : : ; cn) = (c1 (t1) ; : : : ; cn (tn)). In particular, player i assigns probability
1 to ci (ti) throughout the game. For each conjecture i of type ti, we write SBRi (ijti)
for the set of actions ai 2 Ai that remain a best response to i at all information sets
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that are not precluded by ai; we refer to ai 2 SBRi (ijti) as a sequential best response.
A solution concept i : ti 7! i [ti]  Ai, i 2 N , is said to have the sequential best-reply
property if and only if for each ti and for each ai 2 i [ti], there exists a conjecture i of ti
such that ai 2 SBRi (ijti), the beliefs about (; t i) according to i;? agree with ti and
i;? (a i 2  i [t i]) = 1, where ? denotes the initial node of the game. We dene interim
sequential rationalizability (ISR), denoted by ISR1, as the largest solution concept that has
the sequential best-reply property. In nite games this is equivalent to the result of a iterative
elimination process similar to iterative elimination of strictly dominated actions (see Penta
(2012a) for that alternative denition). Note that ISR di¤ers from ICR only in requiring
sequential rationality, rather than normal-form rationality. The only restriction here comes
from the common knowledge assumption that the player i does not change his belief about ci,
since the playersconjectures o¤ the path are otherwise unrestricted. The resulting solution
concept is relatively weak (e.g. weaker than extensive form rationalizability) and equal to
ICR in rich environments.9 We use the following richness assumption of Penta (2012a).
Assumption 1. For every ai 2 Ai there exists cai such that ai conditionally dominant under
cai, i.e., at every history that is consistent with ai, following ai is better than deviating from
ai.
Lemma 2 (Penta (2012a)). Under Assumption 1, for any nite-horizon multistage game
( ;; T; ) with   f (C), for any type ti 2 Ti of any player i 2 N , any ISR action
ai 2 ISR1i [ti] of ti, and any neighborhood Ui of hi(ti) in the universal type space T , there
exists a hierarchy hi
 
t^i
 2 Ui \ TCi ; such that for each a0i 2 ISR1i t^i, a0i is equivalent to
ai.
Note that the above model maintains two common-knowledge assumptions throughout the
perturbations: (i) each player i assigns probability one on the true value of ci (in dening
the interim beliefs at the beginning of the game) and (ii) the players never doubt this fact
throughout the play of the game (in dening the conjectures ). Lemma 7 establishes that,
under Assumption 1, maintaining the common knowledge of (i) has no bite because ISR
is equal to ICR in static games. It also establishes, however, that maintaining common
9For example, ISR is equal to ICR if for every ai and ci, there exists (c0; c i) such that ai is conditionally
dominant under (c0; ci; c i) (cf. Assumption 1). ISR is equal to ICR also when no player has any information.
See Penta (2009) for further details.
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knowledge of (ii) leads to potentially sharper predictions in dynamic games, as ISR may be
a strict renement of ICR in such games. The next result extends Pentas result to innite
horizon games.
Proposition 7. Under Assumption 1, consider any multistage game ( ;; T; ) that is
continuous at innity and   f (C) is such that each  = f (c) 2  is in the interior
of f (C0  f(c1; : : : ; cn)g). For any type ti 2 Ti of any player i 2 N , any ISR action ai 2
ISR1i [ti] of ti, any neighborhood Ui of hi(ti) in the universal type space T
, and any L, there
exists a hierarchy hi
 
t^i
 2 Ui \TCi ; such that for each a0i 2 ISR1i t^i, a0i is L-equivalent to
ai, and t^i is a type in some nite, common-prior model.
Penta (2012a) proves this result for nite games without requiring that  is in the interior
of f (C0  f(c1; : : : ; cn)g). Here, we extend this result to innite-horizon games, with the
above requirement that one can make slight payo¤ perturbations in payo¤s by changing c0
alone. This is required only for uniformly small perturbations, in that there exists " > 0
such that if j (z)  0 (z)j  " for all z 2 Z, then there exists a c0o that leads to 0 instead
of .10 Roughly speaking, Proposition 7 characterizes the robust prediction of common
knowledge of sequential rationality and the informational assumptions, such as the true
value of each ci is known by player i, who never updates his beliefs regarding ci. These are
the predictions that can be made by interim sequential rationality alone. One cannot obtain
a sharper robust prediction than those of interim sequential rationalizability by considering
its renements, even if one is willing to retain common knowledge assumptions regarding
playersinformation.
Using Proposition 7, one can also extend our other results to this framework. Here, we
will only formally present the extension of Corollary 1, our structure theorem for equilibrium
in the case of complete information; the proof is relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 8. Under Assumption 1, let
 
 ; fg ;tCK ()	 ;  be a multi-stage complete-
information game that is continuous at innity, with  = f (c) 2  in the interior of
f (C0  f(c1; : : : ; cn)g). Let also a 2 ISR1

tCK ()

be a Nash equilibrium of this game.
10While this assumption rules out pure private value environments in which jC0j = 1, it allows approximate
private value environments in which the players know their payo¤ functions up to an arbitrarily small error
".
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Then, for any i 2 N , for any L <1, for any neighborhood Ui of hi(tCKi ()) in the universal
type space T , and any " > 0, there exists a hierarchy hi
 
t^i
 2 Ui \ TCi ; such that for every
ISR belief  of t^i,
(1) ai 2 ISR1i

t^i

i¤ ai is L-equivalent to ai ;
(2) Pr (z (a) j; ai )  1  ", and
(3) jE [uj (; a) j; ai ]  uj (; a)j  " for all j 2 N .
Like Proposition 4, this result remains silent for the tail behavior, establishing uniqueness
of ISR only up to an arbitrary nite horizon. The result is stronger than Corollary 1, in that
the perturbed types are in TCi , retaining common knowledge of informational assumptions.
Note that the result also assumes that a is ISR, putting a weak restriction on equilibrium.
Since subgame-perfect equilibria of a repeated game are ISR, the unrenable folk theorem
in Proposition 3 also extends to the current setup.
7. Conclusion
In economic models there are often a multitude of equilibria. This problem is especially
acute in innite-horizon games, such as repeated games, in which the folk theorem applies,
establishing that any feasible payo¤ vector can be supported by an equilibrium. In response
to such multiplicity, economists often focus on renements. In this paper, we develop a struc-
ture theorem for innite-horizon games that can be readily used in applications. Our result
establishes that without any common-knowledge assumption regarding payo¤s and informa-
tion structure, one cannot obtain any robust prediction that is not implied by Bayesian Nash
equilibrium alone. As an application, we prove an unrenable folk theorem, showing that no
feasible payo¤ vector can be excluded if there is noise in our knowledge of playersbeliefs.
Our construction allows uncertainty only about the stage payo¤s. This shows that, even
without the large set of commitment types used in the reputation literature, the uncertainty
behind the structure theorem can operate with full force.
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
A.1. Preliminaries. We start by describing some notation we use in the appendix.
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Notation 1. For any belief  2 (A i) and action ai and for any history h, write E [jh; ai; ]
for the expectation operator induced by action ai and  conditional on reaching history h. For any
strategy prole s : T ! A and any type ti, we write  (jti; s i) 2 ( T i A i) for the belief
induced by ti and s i. Given any functions f : W ! X and g : Y ! Z, we write (f; g) 1 for the
pre-image of the mapping (w; y) 7! (f (w) ; g (y)).
We now dene some basic concepts and present some preliminary results. By a Bayesian game
in normal form, we mean a tuple (N;A; u;; T; ) where N is the set of players, A is the set of
action proles, (; T; ) is a model, and u :   A ! [0; 1]n is the payo¤ function. We will also
dene some auxiliary Bayesian games with di¤erent action spaces, payo¤ functions and parameter
spaces. For any G = (N;A; u;; T; ), we say that ai and a0i are G-equivalent if
u (; ai; a i) = u
 
; a0i; a i

(8 2 ; a i 2 A i) :
By a reduced-form game, we mean a game GR =
 
N; A; u;; T; 

where Ai contains one repre-
sentative action from each G-equivalence class for each i. Rationalizability depends only on the
reduced form:
Lemma 3. Given any game G and a reduced form GR for G, for any type ti, the set S1i [ti] of
rationalizable actions in G is the set of all actions that are G-equivalent to some rationalizable
action of ti in GR.
The lemma follows from the fact that in the elimination process, all members of an equivalence
class are eliminated at the same time; i.e. one eliminates, at each stage, a union of equivalence
classes. It implies the following isomorphism for rationalizability.
Lemma 4. Let G = (N;A; u;; T; ) and G0 = (N;A0; u0;0; T 0; ) be Bayesian games in normal
form, i : Ai ! A0i, i 2 N , be onto mappings, and ' :  ! 0 and  i : Ti ! T 0i , i 2 N , be
bijections. Assume (i)  i(ti) = ti  (';  i) 1 for all ti and (ii) u0 (' () ;  (a)) = u (; a) for all
(; a). Then, for any ti and ai,
(A.1) ai 2 S1i [ti] () i (ai) 2 S1i [ i (ti)] :
Note that the bijections ' and  are a renaming, and (i) ensures that the beliefs do not change
under the renaming. On the other hand, i can map many actions to one action, but (ii) ensures
that all those actions are G-equivalent. The lemma concludes that rationalizability is invariant to
such a transformation.
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Proof. First note that (ii) implies that for any ai; a0i 2 Ai,
(A.2) ai is G-equivalent to a0i () i (ai) is G0-equivalent to i
 
a0i

:
In particular, if i (ai) = i (a
0
i), then ai is G-equivalent to a
0
i. Hence, there exists a reduced-form
game GR =
 
N; A; u;; T; 

for G, such that  is a bijection on A, which is formed by picking a
unique representative from each  1 ( (a)). Then, by (A.2) again, G0R =
 
N;
 
A

; u0;0; T 0; 

is a reduced form for G0.11 Note that GR and G0R are isomorphic up to the renaming of actions,
parameters, and types by , ', and  , respectively. Therefore, for any a0i 2 Ai and ti, a0i is
rationalizable for ti in GR i¤ i (a
0
i) is rationalizable for  i (ti) in G
0
R. Then, Lemma 3 and (A.2)
immediately yields (A.1). 
We will also apply a Lemma from Mertens-Zamir (1985) stating that the mapping from types in
any type space to their hierarchies is continuous, provided the belief mapping  dening the type
space is continuous.
Lemma 5 (Mertens and Zamir (1985)). Let (; T; ) be any model, endowed with any topology,
such that  T is compact and ti is a continuous function of ti. Then, h is continuous.
A.2. Truncated and Virtually Truncated Games. We now formally introduce an equivalence
between nitely-truncated games and payo¤ functions that implicitly assume such a truncation.
For any positive integer m, dene a truncated extensive game form  m =
 
N;Hm; (Ii)i2N

by
Hm = fhmjh 2 Hg :
The set of terminal histories in Hm is
Zm = fzmjz 2 Zg :
We dene
m =

[0; 1]Z
m
n
as the set of payo¤ functions for truncated game forms. Since Zm is not necessarily a subset of Z,
m is not necessarily a subset of . We will now embed m into  through an isomorphism to
a subset of . Dene the subset
^m =

 2 j (h) =   h for all h and h with hm = hm	 :
11Proof: Since i is onto, A
0
i = i (Ai). Moreover, for any i (ai) 2 A0i, there exists a0i 2 Ai that is
G-equivalent to ai. By (A.2), i (ai) is G
0-equivalent to i (a
0
i) 2 i
 
Ai

.
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This is the set of payo¤ functions for which moves after period m are irrelevant. Games with such
payo¤s are nominally innite but inherently nite, so we refer to them as virtually truncated.
We formalize this via the isomorphism 'm : 
m ! ^m dened by setting
(A.3) 'm () (h) =  (h
m)
for all  2 m and h 2 Z, where hm 2 Hm is the truncation of h at length m. Clearly, under the
product topologies, 'm is an isomorphism, in the sense that it is one-to-one, onto, and both 'm
and ' 1m are continuous. For each ai 2 Ai, let ami be the restriction of action ai to the histories with
length less than or equal tom. The set of actions in the truncated game form is Ami = fami jai 2 Aig.
Lemma 6. Let G = ( ;; T; ) and Gm = ( m;m; Tm; ) be such that (i) m  m, (ii)  =
'm (
m) and (iii) Ti = mi (T
m
i ) for some bijection 
m
i and such that mi (tmi )
= tmi 
 
'm; 
m
 i
 1
for each tmi 2 Tmi . Then, the set of rationalizable actions are m-equivalent in G and Gm:
ai 2 S1i [mi (tmi )] () ami 2 S1i [tmi ] (8i; tmi ; ai) :
Proof. In Lemma 4, take ' = ' 1m ,  i = (mi )
 1, and  : ai 7! ami . We only need to check that
um
 
' 1m () ; am

= u (; a) for all (; a) where um denotes the utility function in the truncated
game Gm. Indeed, writing zm (am) for the outcome of am in Gm, we obtain
um
 
' 1m () ; a
m

= ' 1m () (z
m (am)) = ' 1m () (z (a)
m)
= 'm
 
' 1m ()

(z (a)) =  (z (a)) = u (; a) :
Here, the rst and the last equalities are by denition; the second equality is by denition of am,
and the third equality is by denition (A.3) of 'm. 
Let T m be the m-based universal type space, which is the universal type space generated by
the truncated extensive game form. This space is distinct from the universal type space, T , for
the original innite-horizon extensive form. We will now dene an embedding between the two
type spaces, which will be continuous and one-to-one and preserve the rationalizable actions in the
sense of Lemma 6.
Lemma 7. For any m, there exists a continuous, one-to-one mapping m : T m ! T  with
m (t) = (m1 (t1) ; : : : ; 
m
n (tn)) such that for all i 2 N and ti 2 T mi ,
(1) ti is a hierarchy for a type from a nite model if and only if mi (ti) is a hierarchy for a
type from a nite model;
(2) ti is a hierarchy for a type from a common-prior model if and only if mi (ti) is a hierarchy
for a type from a common-prior model, and
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(3) for all ai, ai 2 S1i [mi (ti)] if and only if ami 2 S1i [ti].
Proof. Since T m and T  do not have any redundant types, by the analysis of Mertens and Zamir
(1985), there exists a continuous and one-to-one mapping m such that
(A.4) mi (ti) = ti 
 
'm; 
m
 i
 1
for all i and ti 2 T mi .12 First two statements immediately follow from (A.4). Part 3 follows from
(A.4) and Lemma 6. 
In Weinstein and Yildiz (2007), we proved a version of Proposition 1 for nite action games. We
used a richness assumption on  that is natural for static games but rules out xing a dynamic
extensive game form. Chen (2012) has proven this result for nite dynamic games, under a weaker
richness assumption that is satised in our formulation. Our proof of Proposition 1 will take
advantage of these earlier results. In particular, we will use this lemma, which is implied by Chens
theorem:
Lemma 8 (Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) and Chen (2012)). For any nite-horizon game ( ;; T; ),
for any type ti 2 Ti of any player i 2 N , any rationalizable action ai 2 S1i [ti] of ti, and any
neighborhood Ui of hi(ti) in the universal type space T , there exists a hierarchy hi
 
t^i
 2 U; such
that for each a0i 2 S1i

t^i

, a0i is equivalent to ai, and t^i is a type in some nite, common-prior
model.
We will prove the proposition in several steps.
Step 1 . Fix any positive integer m. We will construct a perturbed incomplete information game
with an enriched type space and truncated time horizon at m under which each rationalizable
action of each original type remains rationalizable for some perturbed type. For each rationalizable
action ai 2 S1i [ti], let
X [ai; ti] =

a0i 2 S1i [ti] ja0i is m-equivalent to ai
	
and pick a representative action rti (ai) from each set X [ai; ti]. We will consider the type space
~Tm = ~Tm1      ~Tmn with
~Tmi = f(ti; rti (ai) ;m) jti 2 Ti; ai 2 S1i [ti]g :
12If one writes ti =
 
t1i ; t
2
i ; : : :

and mi (ti) =

m;1i
 
t1i

; m;2i
 
t2i

; : : :

as a hierarchies, we dene mi
inductively by setting m;1i
 
t1i

= t1i  ' 1m and m;ki
 
tki

= tki 

'm; 
m;1
 i ; : : : ; 
m;k 1
 i
 1
for k > 1.
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Note that each type here has two dimensions, one corresponding to the original type the second
corresponding to an action. Note also that ~Tm is nite because there are nitely many equivalence
classes X [ai; ti], allowing only nitely many representative actions rti (ai). Towards dening the
beliefs, recall that for each (ti; rti (ai) ;m), since rti (ai) 2 S1i [ti], there exists a belief ti;rti (ai) 2
( T i A i) under which rti (ai) is a best reply for ti and margT i(ti;rti (ai)) = ti . Dene
a mapping ti;rti (ai);m : 
 !  between the payo¤ functions by setting
(A.5) ti;rti (ai);m () (h) = E
h
 (h) jhm; rti (ai) ; ti;rti (ai)
i
at each  2  and h 2 Z. Dene a joint mapping
(A.6) ti;rti (ai);m : (; t i; a i) 7!

ti;rti (ai);m
() ; (t i; rt i (a i) ;m)

on tuples for which a i 2 S1 i [t i]. We dene the belief of each type (ti; rti (ai) ;m) by
(A.7) ti;rti (ai);m = 
ti;rti (ai)   1ti;rti (ai);m:
Note that ti;rti (ai);m has a natural meaning. Imagine a type ti who wants to play rti (ai) under
a belief ti;rti (ai) about (; t i; a i). Suppose he assumes that payo¤s are xed as if after m the
continuation will be according to him playing rti (ai) and the others playing according to what is
implied by his belief ti;rti (ai). Now he considers the outcome paths up to length m in conjunction
with (; t i). His belief is then ti;rti (ai);m. Let
~m = [ti;rti (ai)ti;rti (ai);m (). The perturbed
model is

~m; ~Tm; 

. We write ~Gm =

 ; ~m; ~Tm; 

for the resulting virtually truncated
Bayesian game.
Step 2 . For each ti and ai 2 S1i [ti], the hierarchies hi (ti; rti (ai) ;m) converge to hi (ti).
Proof: Let ~T1 =
1[
m=1
~Tm [ T be a type space with beliefs as in each component of the union,
and topology dened by the basic open sets being singletons f(ti; rti (ai) ;m)g together with sets
f(ti; rti (ai) ;m) : ai 2 S1i [ti] ;m > kg [ ftig for each ti 2 T and integer k. That is, the topology
is almost discrete, except that there is non-trivial convergence of sequences (ti; rti (ai) ;m) ! ti.
Since ~T1 is compact under this topology, Lemma 5 will now give the desired result, once we prove
that the map  from types to beliefs is continuous. This continuity is the substance of the proof
if not for the need to prove this, our denition of the topology would have made the result true
by at.
At types (ti; rti (ai) ;m) the topology is discrete and continuity is trivial, so it su¢ ces to shows
continuity at types ti. Since  is nite, by continuity at innity, for any " we can pick an m such
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that for all  2 ,
i (h)  i(~h) < " whenever hm = ~hm. Hence, by (A.5),
ti;rti (ai);m () (h)  (h) = E h ~h j~hm = hm; rti (ai) ; ti;rti (ai)i  (h)
 E
h ~h  (h) j~hm = hm; rti (ai) ; ti;rti (ai)i < ":
Thus, ti;rti (ai);m () (h) ! (h) for each h, showing that ti;rti (ai);m () ! . From the den-
ition (A.6) we see that this implies ti;rti (ai);m (; t i; a i) ! (; t i) as m ! 1. (Recall that 
t i; rt i (a i) ;m
! t i.) Therefore, by (A.7), as m!1,
ti;rti (ai);m ! 
ti;rti (ai)  proj 1T i = margT i(ti;rti (ai)) = ti ;
which is the desired result.
Step 3 . The strategy prole s : ~Tm ! A with si (ti; rti (ai) ;m) = rti (ai) is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium in ~Gm.
Proof : Towards dening the belief of a type (ti; rti (ai) ;m) under s

 i, dene mapping
 :
 
; t i; rt i (a i) ;m
 7!  ; t i; rt i (a i) ;m; rt i (a i) ;
which describes s i. Then, given s

 i, his beliefs about  ~T i A i is

 jti; rti (ai) ;m; s i = ti;rti (ai);m   1 = ti;rti (ai)   1ti;rti (ai);m   1;
where the second equality is by (A.7). His induced belief about A i is
margA i
 jti; rti (ai) ;m; s i = ti;rti (ai)   1ti;rti (ai);m   1  proj 1A i
= ti;rti (ai) 

ti;rti (ai);m
; r i
 1
(A.8)
where r i : (t i; a i) 7! rt i (a i). To see this, note that
projA i    ti;rti (ai);m : (; t i; a i) 7!

ti;rti (ai);m
() ; rt i (a i)

:
Now consider any deviation a0i such that a
0
i (h) = rti (ai) (h) for every history longer than m. It
su¢ ces to focus on such deviations because the moves after length m are payo¤-irrelevant under
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~m by (A.5). The expected payo¤ vector from any such a0i is
E
h
u
 
; a0i; s

 i
 jti;rti (ai);mi = E huti;rti (ai);m () ; a0i; rt i (a i) jti;rti (ai)i
= E
h
ti;rti (ai);m
()
 
z
 
a0i; rt i (a i)
 jti;rti (ai)i
= E
h
E
h

 
z
 
a0i; rt i (a i)
 jz  a0i; rt i (a i)m ; rti (ai) ; ti;rti (ai)i jti;rti (ai)i
= E
h
E
h

 
z
 
a0i; rt i (a i)
 jz  a0i; rt i (a i)m ; a0i; ti;rti (ai)i jti;rti (ai)i
= E
h

 
z
 
a0i; rt i (a i)
 jti;rti (ai)i ;
where the rst equality is by (A.8); the second equality is by denition of u; the third equality
is by denition of ti;rti (ai);m, which is (A.5); the fourth equality is by the fact that a
0
i is equal
to rti (ai) conditional on history z
 
a0i; rt i (a i)
m, and the fth equality is by the law of iterated
expectations. Hence, for any such a0i,
E
h
ui
 
; rti (ai) ; s

 i
 jti;rti (ai);mi = E hi  z  rti (ai) ; rt i (a i) jti;rti (ai)i
 E
h
i
 
z
 
a0i; rt i (a i)
 jti;rti (ai)i
= E
h
ui
 
; a0i; s

 i
 jti;rti (ai);mi ;
where the inequality is by the fact that rti (ai) is a best reply to 
ti;rti (ai), by denition of ti;rti (ai).
Therefore, rti (ai) is a best reply for type (ti; rti (ai) ;m), and hence s
 is a Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium.
Step 4 . Referring back to the statement of the proposition, by Step 2, pick m, ti, and ai such that
m > L and hi((ti; rti (ai) ;m)) 2 Ui. By Step 3, ai is rationalizable for type (ti; rti (ai) ;m).
Proof : Since hi((ti; rti (ai) ;m))! hi(ti) and Ui is an open neighborhood of ti, hi((ti; rti (ai) ;m)) 2
Ui for su¢ ciently large m. Hence, we can pick m as in the statement. Moreover, by Step 3, rti (ai)
is rationalizable for type (ti; rti (ai) ;m) (because it is played in an equilibrium). This implies also
that ai is rationalizable for type (ti; rti (ai) ;m), because m-equivalent actions are payo¤-equivalent
for type (ti; rti (ai) ;m).
The remaining steps will show that a further perturbation makes ai uniquely rationalizable.
Step 5 . Dene hierarchy hi
 
~ti
 2 T mi for the nite-horizon game form  m by
hi
 
~ti

= (mi )
 1 (hi((ti; rti (ai) ;m))) ;
where mi is as dened in Lemma 7 of Section A.2. Type ~ti comes from a nite game G
m =
( m;m; Tm; ) and ami 2 S1i

~ti

.
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Proof : By Lemma 7, since type (ti; rti (ai) ;m) is from a nite model, so is ~ti. Since ai is
rationalizable for type (ti; rti (ai) ;m), by Lemma 7, a
m
i is rationalizable for hi
 
~ti

and hence for
type ~ti in Gm.
Step 6 . By Step 5 and Lemma 8, there exists a hierarchy hi (tmi ) in open neighborhood (
m
i )
 1 (Ui)
of hi
 
~ti

such that each element of S1i [t
m
i ] is m-equivalent to a
m
i , and t
m
i is a type in a nite,
common-prior model.
Proof : By the denition of hi
 
~ti

in Step 5, hi
 
~ti
 2 (mi ) 1 (Ui). Since Ui is open and mi is
continuous, (mi )
 1 (Ui) is open. Moreover, ~ti comes from a nite game, and ami is rationalizable
for ~ti. Therefore, by Lemma 8, there exists a hierarchy hi (tmi ) in (
m
i )
 1 (Ui) as in the statement
above.
Please note that the unique ICR action in this perturbation will be robust to further small
perturbations, just as in the original structure theorem of Weinstein and Yildiz (2007), so long as
we conne attention to the truncated game form  m, since here the game is nite and the results
of Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007) apply. However, once we apply the following step to pull
back the constructed type to lie in the original, innite game-form, this statement is known to be
true only for perturbations that retain common knowledge of ^m. The statement is not necessarily
true for the perturbations that lie outside the image of the embedding.
Step 7 . Dene the hierarchy hi
 
t^i

by
hi
 
t^i

= mi (hi (t
m
i )) :
The conclusion of the proposition is satised by t^i.
Proof : Since hi (tmi ) 2 (mi ) 1 (Ui),
hi
 
t^i

= mi (hi (t
m
i )) 2 mi

(mi )
 1 (Ui)

 Ui:
Since tmi is a type from a nite, common-prior model, by Lemma 7, t^i can also be picked from a
nite, common-prior model. Finally, take any a^i 2 S1i

t^i

. By Lemma 7, a^mi 2 S1i

t^i

. Hence, by
Step 6, a^mi is m-equivalent to a
m
i . It then follows that a^i is m-equivalent to ai. Since m > L, a^i is
also L-equivalent to ai.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2
Using Proposition 1, we rst establish that every action can be made rationalizable for some type.
This extends the lemma of Chen from equivalence at histories of bounded length to equivalence at
histories of unbounded length.
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Lemma 9. For all plans of action ai; there is a type tai of player i such that ai is the unique
rationalizable action plan for tai, up to reduced-form equivalence.
Proof. The set of non-terminal histories is countable, as each of them has nite length. Index the
set of histories where it is is move and the history thus far is consistent with ai as fh (k) : k 2 Z+g.
By Proposition 1, for each k there is a type tk i whose rationalizable actions are always consistent
with history h (k). We construct type tai as follows: his belief about t i assigns probability 2 k
to type tk i. His belief about  is a point-mass on the function ai , dened as 1 if all of is actions
were consistent with ai and 1  2 k if his rst inconsistent move was at history h (k). Now, if type
tai plays action ai he receives a certain payo¤ of 1. If his plan bi is not reduced-form equivalent
to ai, let h (k) be the shortest history in the set fh (k) : k 2 Z+g where bi(h (k)) 6= ai(h (k)).
By construction, there is probability at least 2 k of reaching this history if he believes the other
players action is rationalizable, so his expected payo¤ is at most 1   2 2k. This completes the
proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2. We rst show that (A) implies (B). Assume that s is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of G. Construct a family of types  j (tj ;m; ), j 2 N , tj 2 Tj , m 2 N,  2 [0; 1], as
follows
 j (tj ; 0; ) = t
sj (tj);
j(tj ;m;) = 
t
s
j(tj)
+ (1  )tj ;m; 8m > 0
where
tj ;m; (;  j (t j ;m  1; )) = tj (; t j) 8 (; t j) 2  T j :
For large m and small ,  j (ti;m; ) satises all the properties of t^i, as we establish below.
Now, we use mathematical induction on m to show that for all  > 0 and for all m and tj ,
aj 2 S1j [ j (tj ;m; )] if and only if aj is equivalent to sj (tj), establishing the rst conclusion in
(B). This statement is true for m = 0 by denition of  j (tj ; 0; ) and Lemma 9. Now assume that
it is true up to some m   1. Consider any rationalizable belief of any type  j (tj ;m; ). With
probability , his belief is the same as that of ts

j (tj). By denition, sj (tj) is the unique best
response to this belief in reduced form actions. With probability 1   , his belief on   A j
is the same as the equilibrium belief of tj on   A j . The action sj (tj) is also a best reply to
this belief because s is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the original game. Therefore, sj (tj) is the
unique best response to the rationalizable belief of type  j (tj ;m; ) in reduced form. Since type
 j (tj ;m; ) and his rationalizable belief are picked arbitrarily, this proves the statement.
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Note that by the preceding paragraph, for any  > 0 and m > 0,  j (tj ;m; ) has a unique
rationalizable belief
 (tj ;m; ) = j(tj ;m;)   1j;m;
where
j;m; : (; h j (t j ;m; )) 7!
 
; h j (t j ;m; ) ; s j (t j)

:
Here, the mapping j;m; corresponds to the fact that the newly constructed types play according to
the equilibrium strategy of the original types. We leave the actions of the other types unassigned as
their actions are not relevant for our proof. For  = 0, we dene  (tj ;m; ) by the same equation,
although the type  j (tj ;m; ) may also have other rationalizable beliefs.
In order to show that for large m and small , the beliefs of  j (tj ;m; ) are as in the proposition,
note that for  = 0, themth-order belief of  j (tj ;m; 0) is equal to themth-order belief of tj . Hence,
as m!1, hj ( j (tj ;m; 0))! hj (tj) for each j. Consequently, for each j, as m!1,  (tj ;m; 0)
converges to
tj = tj 


j
 1
with 
j
: (; t j) 7!
 
; t j ; s j (t j)

:
Note that tj is the equilibrium belief of type tj under s
. Therefore, there exists m > 0 such that
hi ( i (ti; m; 0)) 2 Ui and  (ti;m; 0) 2 Vi. Moreover, for j 2 N , m  m, and  2 [0; 1], beliefs of
 j (tj ;m; 0) are continuous in . Hence, by Lemma 5,13 for each tj , as  ! 0, hj ( j (tj ; m;)) !
hj ( j (tj ; m; 0)) and (thereby)  (tj ;m; ) !  (tj ;m; 0). Thus, there exists  > 0 such that
hi
 
 i
 
ti; m; 
 2 Ui and   ti;m;  2 Vi. Therefore, the type t^i =  i  ti; m;  satises all the
properties in (B).
In order to show the converse (i.e. that (B) implies (A)), take any type ti and assume (B). Then,
there exists a sequence of types t^i (m) with unique rationalizable beliefs ^m 2 
 
  T  i A i

and unique rationalizable action si (ti) where ^m converges to the belief 

ti of type ti under s
.
Since si (ti) 2 S1i

t^i (m)

, si (ti) 2 BR

margA i ^m

for each m. Since ui is continuous and
^m ! ti , together with the Maximum Theorem, this implies that si (ti) 2 BR

margA i

ti

,
showing that si (ti) is a best reply to s

 i for type ti. Since ti is arbitrary, this proves that s
 is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 
13To ensure compactness, put all of the types in construction of types ts

j (tj) together and for  (tj ;m; )
with tj 2 Tj , j 2 N , m 2 f0; 1; : : : ; mg,  2 [0; 1], use the usual topology for (tj ;m; ).
ROBUST PREDICTIONS 37
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 4
We write T
CK()
i for the set of types of player i according to which it is common knowledge
that  2  , i.e. that we are playing a repeated game with discount factor . In order to harness
our previous constructions, in Lemma 11 we will construct, for every possible plan ai and nite
time horizon L, a type in T
CK()
i for which all rationalizable plans are L-equivalent to ai. These
types then play the role that dominant-action types would play in richer environments. Our rst
step towards this, Lemma 10, constructs types who do not believe the other playersactions ever
a¤ect them directly, but who nd othersactions informative about their own payo¤s. They are
further constructed so as to always choose the myopicaction, optimizing the expected payo¤ in
the current period. This construction will not work on all plans, but only on those satisfying this
version of the sure-thing principle:
Denition 1. A plan ai is said to be sure-thing compliant if and only if there is no partial history
h and move bi 2 Bi such that ai(h; (ai(h); b i)) = bi for every b i but ai(h) 6= bi.
In other words, a plan is sure-thing compliant if whenever the player plays bi in all possible
continuations next period, he also plays bi this period. This is of course equivalent to the sure-
thing principle of Savage if the player has the same preferences over his moves in both periods.
Given that, in our construction in the next proof, player i is actually facing a single-player decision
problem with unknown payo¤s, it is not hard to see that this particular construction can only work
for sure-thing compliant plans. Of course the necessity of the condition is not relevant to later
results, and our further construction in Lemma 11 extends the result to all plans.
Lemma 10. For any , any L, and any sure-thing compliant action plan ai, there exists a type
tai;L 2 TCK(

)
i for which all rationalizable plans are L-equivalent to ai.
Proof. We will induct on L. When L = 1, it su¢ ces to consider a type tai;1 who is certain that
in the stage game, ai(?) yields payo¤ 1 while all other actions yield payo¤ 0. Now x L; ai and
assume the result is true for all players and for L  1. In outline: the type we construct will have
payo¤s which are completely insensitive to the actions of the other players, but will nd those
actions informative about his own payo¤s. He also will believe that if he ever deviates from ai,
the other playerssubsequent actions are uninformative  this ensures that he always chooses the
myopically best action.
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Formally: Let H^ be the set of histories of length L  1 in which player i always follows the plan
ai, so that jH^j = jB ijL 1, where B i is the set of proles of static moves for the other players.
For each history h 2 H^, we construct a pair (th i; h), and our constructed type tai;L assigns equal
weight to each of jB ijL 1 such pairs. Each type th i is constructed by applying the inductive
hypothesis to a plan ah i which plays according to history h so long as i follows ai, and simply
repeats the previous move forever if player i deviates. Such plans are sure-thing compliant for the
player(s)  i because at every history, the current action is repeated on at least one branch.
To dene the payo¤ functions h for all h 2 H^, we will need to dene an auxiliary function
f : ~HBi ! R, where ~H is the set of prexes of histories in H^. The motive behind the construction
is that f(h; ) represents is expected value of his stage-game payo¤s conditional on reaching the
history h. The function f is dened iteratively on histories of increasing length. Specically, dene
f as follows: Fix " > 0: Let f(?; ai(?)) = 1 and f(?; b) = 0 for all b 6= ai(?), where ? is the empty
history. Next, assume f(h; ) has been dened and proceed for the relevant one-step continuations
of h as follows:
Case 1: If ai(h; (ai(h); b i)) = ai(h) for all b i, then let f((h; b); ) = f(h; ) for every b.
Case 2: Otherwise, by sure-thing compliance, at least two di¤erent actions are prescribed for con-
tinuations (h; (ai(h); b i)) as we vary b i. For each action bi 2 Bi, let Sbi = fb i : ai(h; (ai(h); b i)) = big
be the set of continuations where bi is prescribed. Then let
f((h; (ai(h); b i)); bi) =
8<: f(h; ai(h)) + " if b i 2 SbijB ijf(h;bi) jSbi j(f(h;ai(h))+")jB ij jSbi j if b i =2 Sbi
where the last denominator is non-zero by the observation that at least two di¤erent actions are
prescribed.
These payo¤s were chosen to satisfy the constraints
f(h; bi) =
1
jB ij
X
b i
f((h; (ai(h); b i)); bi)(C.1)
f(h; ai(h))  f(h; bi) + " (8h; bi 6= ai(h)) :(C.2)
as can be veried algebraically.
For each history h 2 H^, dene the stage-game payo¤ function gh : B ! [0; 1]n by setting
ghi (b) = f(h; bi) and g
h
j (b) = 0 at each b and j 6= i. Dene h accordingly, by
h
 
b0; b1; : : :
  (1  ) 1X
l=0
lgh

bl

;
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as in (4.1). Dene tai;L as mentioned above, by assigning equal weight to each pair (th i; 
h).
We claim that under rationalizable play, from the perspective of type tai;L, when he has followed
ai and reaches history h 2 ~H, f(h; ) is his expected value of the stage-game payo¤ gi. We show
this by induction on the length of histories, backwards. When a history h 2 H^ is reached, player
i becomes certain (assuming rationalizable play) that the opposing types must be th i and thus
the payo¤s must be h, which is the desired result for this case. Suppose the claim is true for all
histories in ~H of length M . Note that type tai;L puts equal weight on all sequences of play for his
opponent. Therefore, for a history h 2 ~H of length M   1, the expected payo¤s are given by the
right-hand-side of (C.1) which proves the claim.
Note also that if he follows ai through period L, player i always learns his true payo¤. Let ai be
the plan which follows ai through period L, then plays the known optimal action from period L+1
onward. We claim that ai strictly outperforms any plan which deviates by period L. The intuitive
argument is as follows. Because type tai;L has stage-game payo¤s which are insensitive to the other
playersmoves, he only has two possible incentives at each stage: the myopic goal of maximizing
his average stage-game payo¤s at the current stage, and the desire to receive further information
about his payo¤s. The former goal is strictly satised by the move prescribed by ai, and the latter
is at least weakly satised by this move, since after a deviation he receives no further information.
Formally, we must show that for any xed plan a0i not L-equivalent to ai and any rationalizable
belief of tai;L, the plan ai gives a better expected payo¤. Given a rationalizable belief on opponents
actions, player i has a uniform belief on the other playersactions as long as he follows ai. Let h^
be a random variable equal to the shortest realized history at which a0i di¤ers from ai before period
L, or 1 if they do not di¤er by period L. Note that the uniform belief on othersactions implies
that h^ 6=1 with positive probability. We show that conditional on any non-innite value of h^, ai
strictly outperforms a0i on average. In fact this is weakly true stage-by-stage, and strictly true at
the rst deviation, because:
At stages 1; :::; jh^j: The plans are identical.
At stage jh^j+ 1: The average payo¤ f(h^; bi) is strictly optimized by ai(h^).
At stages jh^j + 2; :::; L: Along the path observed by a player following a0i, the other players are
known to repeat their stage-jh^j + 1 move at stages jh^j + 2; :::; L. So at these stages, the plan a0i
cannot do better than to optimize with respect to the history truncated at length jh^j + 1. The
plan ai optimizes the expected stage-game payo¤s with respect to a longer history, under which
opposing moves are identical through stage jh^j+ 1. Since he is therefore solving a less-constrained
optimization problem, he must perform better than a0i at each stage jh^j+ 2; :::; L.
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At stages L+ 1; :::: Under plan ai, player i now has complete information about his payo¤ and
optimizes perfectly, so a0i cannot do better.
If h^ =1, again ai cannot be outperformed because he optimizes based on complete information
after L, and ai and a0i prescribe the same behavior before L.
Finally, since there are only nitely many histories and types in the construction, all payo¤s are
bounded and so can be normalized to lie in [0; 1]. 
The next lemma builds on this result to generalize to all action plans.
Lemma 11. For any  2 (0; 1), any L and any action plan ai, there exists a type tai;Li 2 T
CK()
i
for which playing according to ai until L is uniquely rationalizable in reduced form.
Proof. For some b i 2 B i, which will be xed throughout the proof, consider a stage payo¤
function gi with gi
 
bi; b

 i

= 1 and gi (bi; b i) = 0 for all b i 6= b i. That is, player is payo¤ does
not depend on his own action, but only on whether the other players reward him by playing b i.
Write ^ 2  for a payo¤ function resulting from gi, i.e., ^i
 
b0; b1; : : :

= (1  )Pl lgi  bl. This
^ will be xed throughout the proof and the constructed type tai;Li will be certain that payo¤s are
given by ^. Fix an M large enough that M < L (jBij   1) = (2 jBij   1) < L=2. Let H^ be the set
of all histories of length L or less. Let A^ i be the set of action proles a i for which there exists a
function  : H^ B i ! Bi such that
(1) for any l  L+1, any history hl 1 of length l 1 and any (bi; b i) 2 Bi, a i
 
hl 1; (bi; b i)

=
b i if bi = 
 
hl 1; b i

and aj
 
hl 1; (bi; b i)
 6= bj for every j 6= i otherwise;14
(2) 
 
hL; b i
  ai  hL for all those hL such that player i has played according to ai through-
out, and
(3) for any l 2 fL+ 2; : : : ;Mg and any h at the beginning of l, a i (h) = a i
 
hL+1

.
That is: At any history in h 2 H^, the other players reward a unique move  (h; b i) of i at
each history (h; b). The only restriction on which move is rewarded occurs at stage L + 1, when
if player i has followed ai so far, he will be rewarded if he continues to do so. Furthermore, at
stages fL+ 2; : : : ;Mg the other players simply repeat their move from stage L + 1. The set A^ i
is symmetric in all other ways. Note also that at any l  M , a player j either reacts di¤erently
to di¤erent moves of player i or repeats his previous move regardless. Hence, the actions in A^ i
are all sure-thing compliant up to date M , and thus for each a i 2 A^ i, there exists a sure-thing
14Note that hl 1 is the list of moves played at dates 0; 1; : : : ; l   2, and aj
 
hl 1; b

is the move of player
j at date l if players play b at l   1 after history hl 1.
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compliant action a^ i that is M -equivalent to a i. Let A^M i be a nite subset of A i that consists of
one sure-thing compliant element from each M -equivalence class in A^ i. By Lemma 10, for each
a i 2 A^M i, there exists ta i;M for which all rationalizable action proles are M -equivalent to a i.
Consider a type tai;Li that assigns probability 1=
A^m i to each ^; ta i;M with a i 2 A^m i. Note
that, according to tai;Li the rewarded actions up to l = L   1 are independently and identically
distributed with uniform distribution over his moves. This leads to the formulas for the probability
of reward in the next paragraph.
For any history h of length l, write P l (h) for the probability that b

 i is played at date l
conditional on h according to the rationalizable belief of tai;Li . As noted above, by symmetry,
(C.3) P l (h) = 1= jBij 8l  L;
and
(C.4) P L+1 (h) =
8><>:
1 if i follows ai until L
0 if i follows ai until L  1 and deviates at L
1= jBij otherwise.
Denote the expected payo¤ of type tai;Li under any action a
0
i by Ui (a
0
i), and note that
(C.5) Ui
 
a0i
 X
l
(1  ) lE P l ja0i :
Using the above formulas, we will now show that type tai;Li does not have a best response that
di¤ers from ai at some history of length l  L. Consider such an action plan a0i. Dene also ai , by
setting
ai

hl

=
(
ai
 
hl

if l  L
a0i
 
hl

if l > L
at each history hl of length l. We will show that ai yields a strictly higher expected payo¤ than a
0
i.
To this end, for each history h, dene  (h) as the smallest date l such that the play of player i is in
accordance with both ai and a0i throughout history h
l, ai
 
hl
 6= a0i  hl, and player i plays a0i  hl
at date l according to h. (Here,  can be innite. It equals the rst realized di¤erence in moves;
note that even if the two plans are not equivalent, they may not di¤er on a particular history.)
Conditioned on the event  > L, we know  =1, that is, ai and a0i play identical moves and hence
yield the same payo¤. We will show that ai has a strictly higher expected payo¤ than a
0
i when
conditioned on each of the events  = L and  < L. On the event  = L, by (C.3) and (C.4), a0i
yields a payo¤ of
Ui
 
a0ij = L

=
 
1  L+1 = jBij+X
l>M
(1  ) lE P l ja0i;  = L ;
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while, by (C.4), ai yields
Ui (a

i j = L) =
 
1  L+1 = jBij+  L+1   M+1  1 +X
l>M
(1  ) lE [P l jai ;  = L] :
Hence,
Ui (a

i j = L)  Ui
 
a0ij = L

=
 
L+1   M+1+X
l>M
(1  ) l E [P l jai ;  = L]  E P l ja0i;  = L
 L+1   M+1   M+1 > 0;
where the rst inequality holds because P l 2 [0; 1] and the strict inequality follows from our dening
assumption on M .
Similarly, on the event  < L, by (C.3), a0i yields a payo¤ of
Ui
 
a0ij < L

=
 
1  L+1 = jBij+  L+1   M+1  1= jBij+X
l>M
(1  ) lE P l ja0i;  < L ;
while ai yields
Ui (a

i j < L) =
 
1  L+1 = jBij+  L+1   M+1  1 +X
l>M
(1  ) lE [P l jai ;  < L] :
Hence,
Ui (a

i j < L)  Ui
 
a0ij < L

=
 
L+1   M+1 (1  1= jBij) +X
l>M
(1  ) lE [P l jai ;   L]  E

P l ja0i;   L

  L+1   M+1 (1  1= jBij)  M+1 > 0;
where the rst inequality is by the fact that P l 2 [0; 1] and the strict inequality follows from our
dening assumption on M .
Finally, note that Pr (  L) > 0 (as tai;Li puts positive probability at all histories up to date
L and a0i di¤ers from ai at some such history), so we can conclude that a

i yields a strictly higher
expected payo¤ than a0i and hence a
0
i is not optimal. 
This lemma establishes that any action can be made uniquely rationalizable for an arbitrarily
long horizon, even within the restricted class of repeated game payo¤s with the given discount
factor . Using this lemma, we can now prove Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 4. First, note that by continuity at innity there exist  2 (0; 1) and l <
1 such that if a player i assigns at least probability 1    on the event that  = ;g and
everybody follows a up to date l, then the expected payo¤ vector under his belief will be within
" neighborhood of u (;g ; a).
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We construct a family of types tj;m;l;, j 2 N , m; l 2 N,  2

0; 

, by
tj;0;l; = t
aj ;l;
tj;m;l; = ta

j
;l + (1  ) (;g ;t i;m 1;l0;) 8m > 0;
where ta

j ;l 2 TCK(

)
j is the type for whom a

j is uniquely rationalizable up to date l, (;g ;t i;m 1;)
is the Dirac measure that puts probability one on
 
;g ; t i;m 1;l0

and l0 will be dened momen-
tarily. The types tj;m;l; will be constructed in such a way that under any rationalizable plan
they will follow aj up to date l and the rst m orders of beliefs will be within  neighborhood of
tCK (;g). Note that under 
t
a
j
;l it is a unique best reply to follow aj up to date l. Moreover, if
 = ;g and the other players follow a j forever, then it is a best response to follow a

j up to date
l. Hence, it is a unique best response to follow aj up to date l if one puts probability  on ta

j
;l
and (1  ) on the latter scenario with  = ;g . Since there are only nitely many plans to follow
up to date l and the game is continuous at innity, there exists a nite l0  l such that it is still
the unique best response under ;g to follow aj up to date l if the other players played a

 j only
up to date l0. We pick such an l0  l.
We now show that for large m and l and small , ti;m;l; satises all the desired properties of t^i.
First note that for  = 0, under ti;m;l;0, it is mth-order mutual knowledge that  = ;g . Hence,
there exist m and  > 0 such that when m  m and   , the belief hierarchy of ti;m;l; is
within the neighborhood Ui of the belief hierarchy of tCKi (;g), according to which it is common
knowledge that  = ;g . Second, for  > 0, aj is uniquely rationalizable up to date l for tj;m;l; in
reduced form. To see this, observing that it is true for m = 0 by denition of tj;0;l;, assume that
it is true up to some m  1. Then, any rationalizable belief of any type tj;m;l; must be a mixture
of two beliefs. With probability , his belief is the same as that of ta

j ;l, and with probability
1   , he believes that the true state is ;g and the other players play a j (in reduced form) up
to date l0. But we have chosen l0 so that following aj up to date l is a unique best response under
that belief. Therefore, any rationalizable action of tj;m;l; is l-equivalent to aj . Third, for any
m > 0 and l  l, the expected payo¤s are within " neighborhood of u (;g ; a). Indeed, under
rationalizability, type ti;m;l; must assign at least probability 1     1    on  = ;g and that
the other players follow a i up to date l
0  l while he himself follows ai up to date l  l. The
expected payo¤ vector is " neighborhood of u (;g ; a) under such a belief by denition of  and l.
Finally, each tj;m;l; is in T
CK()
j because all possible types in the construction assigns probability
1 on  2  . We complete our proof by picking t^i = ti;m;l; for some m > m, l  max fL; lg, and
 2  0;min; 	. 
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Appendix D. Proofs of Propositions 7 and 8
Here we show how to modify the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 in order to retain the informational
common-knowledge assumptions described in Propositions 7 and 8 and satisfy sequential rationality.
Note that here, a Bayesian game also assigns a payo¤ typeci (ti) 2 Ci for each type ti, and hence
a Bayesian game is a list G = ( ;; T; c; ).
Proof of Proposition 7. Note that as in Lemma 4, ISR1 depends only on the reduced form of a
plan, and, as in Lemma 6, the ISR actions of virtually truncated games are equivalent to the
ISR actions of truncated games. In light of these facts, we now describe the major modications
to each step of the proof of Proposition 1.
In Step 1, we observe that, by the denition of ISR, each rti (ai) is a sequential best response
to a conjecture ti;rti (ai) of ti such that 
ti;rti (ai)
? agrees with ti and puts probability one on ISR
actions. We dene types (ti; rti (ai) ;m) by setting ci (ti; rti (ai) ;m) = ci (ti), so that the private
information does not change, and setting
(D.1) ti;rti (ai);m = 
ti;rti (ai)
?   1ti;rti (ai);m
where ti;rti (ai);m is now dened as
(D.2) ti;rti (ai);m : (c0; t i; a i) 7!

ti;rti (ai);m
(f (c0; ci (ti) ; c i (ti))) ; (t i; rt i (a i) ;m)

:
Since ti;rti (ai);m (f (c0; ci (ti) ; c i (ti))) ! f (c0; ci (ti) ; c i (ti)) as in the proof of Proposition
1, by the interior assumption in the hypothesis, there exists m such that for every m > m;
ti;rti (ai);m
() = f

Gti;rti (ai);m (c0; c i (t i)) ; ci (ti) ; c i (t i)

for someGti;rti (ai);m (c0; c i (t i)) 2
C, ensuring that the newly constructed types are in TC. In Step 2, we prove that ti;rti (ai);m ! ti ,
by observing that ti;rti (ai);m (c0; t i; a i)! (f (c0; ci (ti) ; c i (ti)) ; t i).
In Step 3, we prove that  : (ti; rti (ai) ;m) 7! frti (ai)g is closed under sequentially rational
behavior in ~Gm, so that rti (ai) 2 ISR1i [ti; rti (ai) ;m]. To this end, for each (ti; rti (ai) ;m), we
construct a conjecture ~ of type (ti; rti (ai) ;m) against which rti (ai) is a sequential best response
and ~? puts probability 1 on the graph of , by setting
~h = 
ti;rti (ai)
h  ~
 1
ti;rti (ai);m
  1
where
 :
 
c0; t i; rt i (a i) ;m
 7!  c0; t i; rt i (a i) ;m; rt i (a i)
stipulates that the types play according to , and the mapping
(D.3) ~ti;rti (ai);m : (c0; t i; a i) 7!

Gti;rti (ai);m (f (c0; ci (ti) ; c i (ti))) ; (t i; rt i (a i) ;m)

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incorporates the transformation of c0. By construction, 
ti;rti (ai)
? puts probability 1 on the graph
of , and the belief induced on ~m  ~T i by ~? is ti;rti (ai);m. Towards showing that rti (ai)
is a sequential best response to ~, we also observe that each ~h induces probability distribution

ti;rti (ai)
h 

ti;rti (ai);m
; r i
 1
on   A i as in the proof of Proposition 1, where that belief
was ti;rti (ai) 

ti;rti (ai);m
; r i
 1
. One can then simply replace ti;rti (ai) with 
ti;rti (ai)
h in the
remainder of the proof of that step, to show that rti (ai) is a best response to ~h at each history
h that is not precluded by rti (ai), showing that rti (ai) is a sequential best response to ~ for type
(ti; rti (ai) ;m).
In Step 6, we use Lemma 2 instead of Lemma 8, to obtain a hierarchy hi (tmi ) in open neigh-
borhood (mi )
 1 (Ui) of hi
 
~ti

such that each element of ISR1i [t
m
i ] is m-equivalent to a
m
i and
hi (t
m
i ) 2 TCmi , which is the subspace of T mi in which it is common knowledge that  2 f (C) and
the true value of cj is known by player j for each j. This leads to the type t^i constructed in Step
7 to remain in TCi and have ai as the unique ISR action up to m-equivalence. 
Though Proposition 8 is a close analogue of the general result on equilibria, Proposition 2, its
proof is more closely analogous to the nal steps in our result specic to repeated games, Proposition
4. (It is in the lemmas preceding that proof that the steps specic to repeated games occur.)
Proof of Proposition 8. In the proof of Proposition 4, modify the types tj;m;l; by substituting 
for ;g and taking t
aj ;l to be the type in TCj for whom a

j is uniquely ISR up to date l and
cj

ta

j ;l

= cj (by Proposition 7). Take also cj (tj;m;l;) = c

j , so that hj (tj;0;l;) 2 TCj . Moreover,
as in the proof of Proposition 4, since playing according to aj up to l is the unique sequential best
response for type tj;m;l; when the others follow a j forever, we can take l
0 su¢ ciently large so that
following aj remains the unique sequential best response up to l when the others follow a

 j up to
l0. As in the proof of Proposition 4, this shows that aj is the unique ISR plan for type tj;m;l;.
Finally, as in the proof of Proposition 4, one can select m, l, and  to satisfy the other properties
in the proposition. 
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